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I. INTRODUCTION
The administrative state has emerged as a pervasive machine that
has become the dominate generator of legal rules—despite the fact
that the U.S. Constitution commits the legislative power to Congress
* Parker S. Kennedy Professor in Law and Associate Dean for Research &
Faculty Development, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. J.D., Cor-
nell Law School, 1998; B.A. Western Michigan University, 1995. This Essay is adapted
from remarks made as a panelist at the Federalist Society National Lawyers Conven-
tion, Washington, D.C., November 18, 2017, on a panel titled: “Environmental Law
without Congress: Are Alternatives to Legislation Eclipsing the Congressional Role in
Setting Policy Priorities for Environmental Protection?” Video is available at https://
fedsoc.org/events/environmental-law-without-congress-are-alternatives-to-legislation-
eclipsing-the-congressional-role (Kochan presentation at 32:30) [https://perma.cc/
76A8-6GED]. An introductory video summarizing my presentation is available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRn6Ee2Aqa0 [https://perma.cc/KM5H-HFLM].
Many thanks to Professor Jonathan H. Adler (Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of
Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law), Professor Michael P.
Vandenbergh (David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law Director, Vanderbilt
Law School), and Professor Robert V. Percival (Professor of Law and Director Envi-
ronmental Law Program, University of Maryland School of Law). I appreciate the




\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL202.txt unknown Seq: 2  8-FEB-19 11:58
324 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
alone. When examining legislation authorizing administrative agencies
to promulgate rules, we are often left asking whether Congress “dele-
gates” away its lawmaking authority by giving agencies too much
power and discretion to decide what rules should be promulgated and
to determine how rich to make their content. If the agencies get broad
authority, it is not too hard to understand why they would fulsomely
embrace the grant to its fullest. Once agencies are let loose by broad
grants of rulemaking authority and they are off to the races, we are
also often left scratching our heads wondering why Congress fails to
intervene ex post to alter the law, to check administrative agency
overreach, or to clarify its intent and preferences. This Essay seeks to
explain why none of the institutional dynamics we observe in adminis-
trative law should be surprising, with particular emphasis on environ-
mental laws and rules. It will explain why both Congress and agencies
have strategic interests at stake that cause them to position their activ-
ities in manners that make each complicit in expansion of the regula-
tory state and the collapse of the containment walls designed to keep
lawmaking inside Congress.
This Essay specifically critiques Congress for its abdication of re-
sponsibility in the natural resources and environmental space—a
place where the problem of congressional acquiescence in the demise
of its own power is particularly acute. This Essay will begin by discuss-
ing the necessity of legislative clarity and intervention in these fields,
but it will also contemplate why we often see neither. It will then pro-
ceed to some specific examples that illustrate these points.
Part II introduces fundamental ideas of separation of powers and
the Framers’ design for adherence to that separation. Part III identi-
fies motivations for Congress to legislate broadly and to disengage
from a supervisory role over agencies, despite contrary intentions in
the Framers design. Part IV discusses agencies as self-interested actors
that will accept legislative-like authority if it is offered to them. Part V
uses case studies on National Monuments and the Waters of the
United States (“WOTUS”) Rule as demonstrative of the strategic
positioning phenomenon. And, Part VI explains why environmental
law is an area in which we can predict a high frequency of these
problems of congressional abdication that enables administrative
overreach.
By revealing these realities of strategic positioning by both Con-
gress and the Executive, it can be better understood why an environ-
mental law generated without optimal (or even fully constitutional)
engagement by Congress is increasingly developing. The goal is to ex-
pose the threat these institutional interests pose to preserving the sep-
aration of powers and to begin identifying the areas to target, if the
current allocation of authority for generating the core requirements of
environmental law is to be realigned with greater fidelity to original
constitutional design.
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II. THE FRAMERS AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
The Framers relied on institutional self-interest as a feature of a
well-functioning system of separated powers.1 If you have not read
Federalist No. 9 lately, I highly recommend revisiting it, especially the
very optimistic and enthusiastic vision for our Federal Republic in its
first three paragraphs. Among those words written over 230 years ago,
Hamilton noted that “[t]he regular distribution of power into distinct
departments . . . are means, and powerful means, by which the excel-
lencies of republican government may be retained and its imperfec-
tions lessened or avoided.”2
Similarly, James Madison observed, particularly in Federalist Nos.
48 and 51, there must be “auxiliary precautions” built into the sys-
tem—beyond mere “parchment barriers”—that recognize realities of
human nature and that control against that nature’s tendency toward
aggrandizement of individual power and influence.3 The Framers
sought to craft a Constitution that would use human nature against
itself—creating incentives for each branch of government to jealously
guard its constitutional prerogatives from attack.4 Thus, Madison ex-
plained in Federalist No. 51 that “[a]mbition must be made to counter-
act ambition.”5 Indeed, counteracting institutions must be established
because “the great security against a gradual concentration of the sev-
eral powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and
personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.”6
Were the Framers wrong or naı̈ve? This system of reciprocal guard-
ing seems to have broken down—the administrative state has grown7
1. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 333–34 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (“But in a representative republic . . . where the legislative power is exercised
by an assembly . . . it is against the enterprising ambition of this department, that the
people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.”).
2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 51; see also
Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 487 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (noting that the three branches need not be “entirely separate and distinct . . .
[b]ut as to the particular divisions of power that the Constitution does in fact draw, we
are without authority to alter them, and indeed we are empowered to act in particular
cases to prevent any other Branch from undertaking to alter them.”).
3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 333; THE FEDER-
ALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 349.
4. See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47–51 (James Madison), supra note 1.
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 349.
6. Id.
7. See LIBERTY’S NEMESIS: THE UNCHECKED EXPANSION OF THE STATE 4–9
(Dean Reuter & John Yoo eds., 2016); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNLAWFUL? 8 (2014) (“[A]dministrative law revives a sort of power that constitutions
were emphatically designed to prohibit.”); Robert J. Samuelson, The Administrative
State is Huge, and It’s Only Getting Bigger, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-administrative-state-is-huge-and-its-only-getting-
bigger/2017/03/05/bb388e28-003a-11e7-99b4-9e613afeb09f_story.html?noredirect=on
&utm_term=.a0c39ea897a3 [https://perma.cc/56FF-GE4E]; Steven F. Hayward, The
Threat to Liberty, 17 CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS 53 (2016–17).
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while Congress has, in a variety of ways, either passively allowed this
distortion without resistance or, at times, even encouraged a power
shift where certain “laws” (including environmental ones) could be
generated without Congress.8 Rather than immense power being
drawn into Congress’s “impetuous vortex”—as Madison worried
could be the case in Federalist No. 489—or that the legislature would
“absorb every other” if not controlled—as feared in Federalist No.
7110—we see something quite different.
This Essay focuses on an institutional-interests model to explain
how and why strategic positioning by both Congress and the Execu-
tive have aligned to facilitate and encourage lawmaking without Con-
gress. Present conditions set the dynamics for mutually reinforcing
and destructive incentives, both for invasions into the province of the
legislature, and for the legislature’s surrender or abdication along the
way.
III. CONGRESS AND THE UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT
STRATEGY
Agencies are regularly criticized for making laws under the guise of
administering legislation. Even when only promulgating rules to ad-
vance a relatively clear will of Congress, when such clarity exists,
agencies are making discretionary decisions over details that involve
policy choices. Despite agency “lawmaking” in these senses diminish-
ing the sphere of Congress’s legislative prerogative, Congress some-
times embraces a larger administrative role because it can generate
gains from passing broad legislation, while avoiding internalizing the
costs of the law’s application.11 In the end, the administrative agency
is often the focus of criticism by any side that dislikes the regulatory
outcome.
Much of this criticism concerns optics and accountability-avoidance.
Assuming it is true that agencies get blamed for disliked regulatory
decisions more than Congress, and that placing the blame on Congress
is the outlier, not the norm, this leaves Congress insulated from criti-
cism and unmotivated to act as an effective check on agency action.
8. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game,
80 GEO. L.J. 523, 535 (1992) (“[W]hen it fails to make clear its policy choices in stat-
utes delegating lawmaking to agencies, Congress has violated a most fundamental
rule and policy in Article I of the Constitution.”); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Assessing
the Administrative State, 32 J.L. & POL. 239, 241 (2017) (“Agencies have grown in part
because Congress simply wished to avoid hard questions.”); James R. Rogers, Why
Congress Cedes Power to the Administrative State, LAW & LIBERTY (Jan. 8, 2018),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2018/01/08/why-congress-cedes-power-to-the-administra
tive-state/ [https://perma.cc/Z3BV-8HFC] (“[F]or their own reasons (avoiding ac-
countability and reducing decisions costs among them), legislators did not want to
make the necessary policy decisions.”).
9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 333.
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 483.
11. Wilkinson, supra note 8.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL202.txt unknown Seq: 5  8-FEB-19 11:58
2019] STRATEGIC INSTITUTIONAL POSITIONING 327
Consider how it might look if things were different. If the blame for
“bad” environmental law—whichever way “bad” is defined—shifted
its frame, the narrative could equally be, for example, that harsh envi-
ronmental law or environmental law “rollback”—take your pick—are
each Congress’s fault because: (1) Congress created the executive dis-
cretion to do either category of thing (over- or under-regulation); and
(2) Congress has not taken new legislative action to force the execu-
tive to change position away from its preferred path.
For example, consider those that want a more aggressive regulatory
approach, perhaps those who cast aspersions on the Trump Adminis-
tration for its mindset of regulatory restraint.12 As a result of the cap-
tive narrative of the powerful administrative state, executive decisions
to exercise discretion not to act, get blamed on the executive—when a
different “framing” of the same phenomenon could be that: (1) Con-
gress deserves the blame for giving agencies enough discretion to
choose not to act; and (2) Congress deserves the blame because it has
not legislated to force the preferred administrative action even when it
may be within its constitutional powers to do so.
Now consider those that want a restrained regulatory approach, in-
cluding those that frowned upon aggressive President Clinton- or
President Obama-era efforts.13 An agency’s choice to use discretion to
interpret broad and often ambiguous statutory language to enlarge its
mandate again gets blamed on the executive agency—when a differ-
ent “framing” of the same phenomenon could be that: (1) Congress
deserves the blame for giving agencies enough discretion to choose to
act; or (2) Congress deserves the blame because it has not legislated to
clarify that the agency does not have such statutory authority to act
and to discipline the agency as ultra vires.
12. Danny Vinik, Trump’s War on Regulations is Real. But is it Working?, POLIT-
ICO (Jan. 20, 2018, 6:26 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2018/01/20/
trumps-regulatory-experiment-year-one-000620 [https://perma.cc/CG44-F53G]; Oli-
ver Milman, Trump’s Alarming Environmental Rollback: What’s Been Scrapped So
Far, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2017/jul/04/trump-emvironmental-rollback-epa-scrap-regulations [https://perma.cc/
KV8V-BH3Y].
13. E.g., Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Obama’s Legacy: 2016 Ends With a Record-Shat-
tering Regulatory Rulebook, FORBES (Dec. 30, 2016, 9:25 AM), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/waynecrews/2016/12/30/obamas-legacy-2016-ends-with-a-record-shattering-
regulatory-rulebook/#26ff52601398 [https://perma.cc/39DA-Q84P]; Timothy Noah,
Obama Pushing Thousands of New Regulations in Year 8, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2016, 5:21
AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/agenda/story/2016/1/obama-regulations-2016
[https://perma.cc/BTC9-8N3G]; contra Patrick McLaughlin & Michael Wilt, The Long
Road to Regulatory Reform, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 28, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://www.us-
news.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2017-08-28/trumps-executive-orders-
are-a-good-start-to-regulatory-reform [https://perma.cc/C8FA-33FA]; Binyamin Ap-
pelbaum & Jim Tankersley, The Trump Effect: Business, Anticipating Less Regulation,
Loosens Purse Strings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/
01/us/politics/trump-businesses-regulation-economic-growth.html [https://perma.cc/
L7A2-57ME].
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From the perspective of separation of powers purists, these account-
ability results and failures to focus on what Congress has or has not
done to deserve blame for the regulatory outcome should seem in-
credibly distorted.14 However, from the expedient perspective of Con-
gress (a body that increasingly proves itself as an ineffective guardian
of the separation of powers), this is brilliant.15 Congress, as an institu-
tion, and congresspersons avoid blame under this alternative lens—
because, “it is not our fault, the agency did it.” Or they are well-posi-
tioned to selectively take credit. Individual members of Congress can
rail against either agency action or inaction, explaining that Congress
has already done its job by interpreting the congressional authority
granted from a lens friendly to their own (or their constituents’) pre-
ferred policy. Alternatively, they can explain a popular agency deci-
sion (on action or inaction) as the result of their heroic and wise
efforts to guide the agency when the congressperson’s preferences are
aligned with the agency choice. That also leaves them open to take
credit for a good law, while allowing them to lambast a rogue agency’s
deviant interpretation of the prior congressional good deeds.
Furthermore, legislating broadly and purposefully abandoning legis-
lative authority to retain greater control over the details of regulatory
policy enables individual congressmen to stake out a constituent-
friendly position by criticizing or supporting the administrative ap-
proach.16 Congress can take credit for past environmental legislative
14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976). The U.S. Supreme Court has
explained:
James Madison, writing in the Federalist No. 47, defended the work of the
Framers against the charge that these three governmental powers were not
entirely separate from one another in the proposed Constitution. He asserted
that while there was some admixture, the Constitution was nonetheless true
to Montesquieu’s well-known maxim that the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial departments ought to be separate and distinct.
Id. at 120.
15. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 931, 1006 (1999) (“[M]embers of Congress . . . find it more convenient
to acquiesce and avoid criticism.”); John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitu-
tional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legisla-
tures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 855 (1991) (“In recent decades there has developed
something approaching a consensus among political scientists and other observers
that Congress has essentially lost the ability to function as a policy-making alternative
to the executive.”); Wilkinson, supra note 8 (“What sometimes makes the passage of
controversial legislation possible is congressional punting on some of the most volatile
issues”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 878–82 (1975) (arguing there are
powerful reasons behind a legislative body’s desire to see its works endure).
16. See Editorial, The Politics of Anti-Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1990, at A24
(“Ed Jenkins, Democrat of Georgia: ‘We are simply afraid to make any difficult deci-
sion. We’re afraid we’ll make someone mad at us.’”); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld,
Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of
Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1979–80 (2008) (“Legislators are directly elected.
If they stray too far from the preferences of their constituents and supporters, they
will not likely be reelected.”).
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successes (including when regulation implementation gains popular
support and can be claimed as resulting from past legislative wisdom)
while shifting blame to agencies when certain outcomes are unfavora-
ble or when desired actions are not taken.
Moreover, when lawmaking without Congress becomes the norm,
Congress is shielded from particularized accountability. Under such
conditions, Congress is not forced to internalize the costs of
gridlock—i.e., it is not forced to overcome gridlock and other barriers
to legislation because it is called to account for, or correct the flaws of,
its vague and incomplete laws at a sub-optimal level. When the public
or others claim that agencies have gone too far, legislators can claim
that they have already done their job and that any perversion of the
congressional will is the result of non-compliant administrators. Be-
cause it is not regularly blamed for the lack of success in the environ-
mental realm—or at least is not the primary culprit in much of
popular opinion— Congress lacks proper motivation to overcome
gridlock and pass new or amended environmental laws17 or act to cor-
rect or direct agency actions.
Congress also escapes blame or seemingly anti-environmental ac-
tion during certain administrations when the executive branch is re-
ceiving incoming fire about the President’s environmental policies.
This happens because members of Congress can claim they have done
their job by passing general legislation, with the popular narrative
crediting Congress for the law but blaming presidential administra-
tions for perceived deficiencies in substance on-the-ground.18 More
often than not, it is seen as the agency’s fault or claimed that the ad-
ministration overseeing the agency is to blame for regulating or for
not regulating. That narrative benefits Congress. Why would Congress
want to disrupt it?
Thus, in environmental law and elsewhere,19 we see a distinct kind
of congressional ambition to shield Congress from accountability by
strategically abdicating lawmaking authority—supplanting the Fram-
ers’ anticipated ambition to erect strong fences around their claim on
17. This gridlock is often blamed for congressional inaction. See Michael J. Teter,
Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2217, 2217–19 (2013).
18. Bill McKibben, A Bad Day for the Environment, with Many More to Come,
NEW YORKER (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-bad-
day-for-the-environment-with-many-more-to-come [https://perma.cc/F75Y-PJ3V]
(bemoaning President Trump’s reversal of environmental protections); Timothy
Cama, EPA Chief: Obama Was No ‘Environmental Savior’, HILL (May 11, 2017, 1:25
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/332958-epa-chief-obama-wasnt-an-
environmental-savior [https://perma.cc/RQ97-6GVM]; Suzanne Goldenberg, The
Worst of Times: Bush’s Environmental Legacy Examined, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2009,
10:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jan/16/greenpolitics-george
bush [https://perma.cc/M9DL-J66F].
19. Fisher, supra note 15, at 1006; The Politics of Anti-Politics, supra note 16, at
A24.
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exclusive legislative authority. Of course, it works all the better when
the agencies become complicit in the process by themselves finding
benefits in this altered allocation of power and control, as the next
Part details.
IV. AGENCY INCENTIVES TO TAKE THE POWER
THEY ARE ALLOWED
At the same time that Congress is willing to step back, agencies are
willing to step in. There is strategic acceptance of enhanced lawmak-
ing authority on the part of ambitious administrative agencies, will-
ingly taking advantage of the opportunity to aggrandize its power. As
Madison counseled, ambition counteracts ambition.20 But make no
mistake, ambition is all around, incentivizing strategic self-preserva-
tionist behavior. Sometimes actors might decide that self-preservation
is best served by not grabbing all the power they might be able to
access or assert. Yet when that happens, other actors with ambition
for power (and seeing a way to enlarge their position) will fill the void.
The authors of The Federalist understood this dance and that one
branch will gladly lead and seize power when another branch demurs.
It is easy to beat up on administrative agencies for being too big and
assertive—but can we really blame them? Are they not just acting like
human beings—as rational power, influence, or wealth maximizers?
Should we be surprised that they wish to position themselves for job
security and perpetuate their existence?
Agency officials who take the openings that Congress is willing to
give are rational power and influence maximizers within a competitive
separation of powers arena. Alexander Hamilton observed in Federal-
ist No. 73 that agency restraint is directly proportional to the level of
anticipated congressional reaction.21 Hamilton explained, “When
men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions
may come from a quarter which they cannot controul, they will often
be restrained by the bare apprehension of opposition, from doing
what they would with eagerness rush into, if no such external impedi-
ments were to be feared.”22
Agencies benefit from this constitutional distortion too. Agencies
get both the power and ability to implement their policy preferences
through discretionary authority to act, to refrain from acting, and to
reverse or alter course. Agencies and agency officials can champion
whichever of those positions best suits their institutional and personal
interests, yet they face much less political risk due to the insulation of
their activities from direct electoral control.
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 349.
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 498.
22. Id.
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Further, agencies have self-interested incentives to do so. Resis-
tance mechanisms develop within agencies and agency officials to
guard agency turf. Preferences for the status quo emerge that make
agencies self-interested in erecting barriers to change. Government
agencies and bureaucracies have demonstrated substantial capacity to
resist adaptation in order to preserve or expand their core functions,
structure, and identity. Bureaucracies and bureaucrats are self-inter-
ested. Studies conclude that bureaucracies exhibit tendencies to per-
petuate themselves. Bureaucrats want to preserve job security; will
work to justify their own existence; wish to capitalize on their devel-
oped, sometimes monopolistic expertise in a certain regulatory field
(i.e., they are the ones that know all the code to the regulatory ma-
chine); wish to expand their budgets; hope to expand personnel and
thereby gain allies; desire an ever-broadening scope of authority; and
otherwise wish to entrench themselves and solidify their reason for
existence.23
More regulation equals more work, which expands the need and
justification for the agency and its officials. Within such a framework,
there is seldom an incentive to change regulatory structure and cer-
tainly even less so to change in a way that shrinks the size of the regu-
latory apparatus. Arnold and Gunderson recognize that there is a
“bias in environmental law to protect presumed static economic effi-
ciencies and to ignore dynamic relationships between economics and
the environment,”24 concluding that “[a]t times, the legal system
seems to operate as if its primary function is to promote the resilience
of the legal system itself.”25
William Niskanen and other economists and political scientists are
not alone in recognizing this general human tendency. Take just one
offbeat example. Internet technology expert Clay Shirky set off a buzz
of discussion throughout the tech world in 2010 after uttering the
words: “Institutions will try to preserve the problem to which they are
the solution.”26 He was not speaking about government bureaucra-
23. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESEN-
TATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971) (examining the tendency for bureaucracies to seek to
maximize their budgets and otherwise perpetuate their existence); William A. Nis-
kanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 618 (1975); William. A. Nis-
kanen, The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 293, 293 (1968);
see also LUDWIG VON MISES, BUREAUCRACY 18–19 (1944) (comparing the relative
efficiency of institutions driven by profit motives versus ineffective institutions driven
by bureaucratic motives).
24. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Lance H. Gunderson, Adaptive Law and Re-
silience, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10426, 10429 (2013) (citing DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECO-
NOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003)).
25. Id.
26. This phrase was apparently first recorded, and therein dubbed “The Shirky
Principle,” by a columnist for the magazine Wired in Kevin Kelly, The Shirky Princi-
ple, TECHNIUM (Apr. 2, 2010), http://kk.org/thetechnium/2010/04/the-shirky-prin/
[https://perma.cc/PPD2-WZ88]; see also Mike Masnick, Institutions Will Try to Pre-
serve the Problem For Which They Are the Solution, TECHDIRT (Apr. 9, 2010, 7:33
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cies,27 but the point is powerful all the same. The issue is really a gen-
eral one about tendencies in human nature. The point is that if the
problems are solved or done more efficiently, or if Congress reins in
agency discretion or authority, there will be less need for those tasked
with solving the problem. Indeed, their usefulness may entirely disap-
pear if the problem is completely eliminated or removed from their
jurisdiction. Thus, officials who have the power within their grasp
need to find a way to grab as much as they can and hang on, yet they
also need the problem with which they are tasked to persist lest they
outlive their usefulness.
The literature is rife with details about these stories on institutional
dynamics. For this Essay’s purposes, several examples from the envi-
ronmental law and natural resources fields add to the mix of exam-
ples. Part V will include case studies that fit the strategic institutional
positioning paradigm sketched in this Essay, while also using these
examples to demonstrate additional lessons regarding the trend to-
ward environmental policy without—or at least beyond—Congress’s
authority.
V. SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASE STUDIES IN STRATEGIC
INSTITUTIONAL POSITIONING
This Part will turn to examples where natural resources and envi-
ronmental policy illustrate these constitutional distortions. Section A
will discuss more than a century of material regarding Congress’s con-
sideration of heightened protective status of public lands as National
Monuments. Part B will look at the whirling world of word games
associated with defining “waters of the United States” under the
Clean Water Act (“CWA”).
A. Example 1: National Monuments
One of the most controversial environmental issues straddling the
Obama and Trump Administrations has been related to National
Monuments, pursuant to the congressional authorization for their dec-
laration under the Antiquities Act of 1906.28 President Obama’s mon-
uments encompassed more than 550 million acres of federal land and
AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100404/2112388868.shtml [https://perma.cc/
BK9N-B9W3].
27. Kelly, supra note 26 (relating to media, industry, and perhaps unions).
28. See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, Midnight Monuments, HILL (Oct. 3, 2016, 9:15
AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/298916-midnight-
monuments [https://perma.cc/W2YM-E3BC]; Donald J. Kochan & Charles Wilkinson,
Midnight Monuments: The Antiquities Act and the Executive Authority to Designate
National Monuments–Podcast, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Sept. 23, 2016), https://fedsoc.org/
commentary/podcasts/midnight-monuments-the-antiquities-act-and-the-executive-au
thority-to-designate-national-monuments-podcast [https://perma.cc/6KRT-GETL]
(summarizing some of the key issues and the debates on legal authority over
monuments).
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water, double the amount of any preceding President.29 There is no
doubt this was an extraordinary use of the Antiquities Act’s authority,
but those who lodge complaints sometimes blame President Obama
too quickly.
I contend that massive executive public lands withdrawals or Na-
tional Monument designations are less concerning as acts of adminis-
trative excess than they are as troublesome examples of congressional
failure. Even now, as the Trump Administration and Secretary Zinke
have reconsidered and altered some of these monument designa-
tions,30 the entire blame/credit story in both the popular media and in
most sophisticated policy debates is on how the Executive views its
role and uses its authority—not on what Congress has done to em-
power such executive declarations with a long statutory leash and not
on what Congress has not done to shorten the leash.
With the exception of some calls for executive restraint—for exam-
ple, calls to let the Public Lands Initiative handle Utah issues31—most
debates are over whether the Obama Administration went too far and
whether the Antiquities Act is a one-way ratchet which the Trump
Administration may use to undo or modify past-designated National
Monuments.32
Many members of Congress cried foul against President Obama for
his monument designations,33 and some others now cry foul against
29. The Editorial Board, Monuments Man, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/12/31/opinion/sunday/monuments-man.html; see also Juliet
Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Obama Names Five New National Monuments, Including




30. Juliet Eilperin & Darryl Fears, Interior Secretary Recommends Trump Alter at




31. Robinson Meyer, Obama’s Environmental Legacy, in Two Buttes, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/12/obamas-environ
mental-legacy-in-two-buttes/511889 [https://perma.cc/3GTG-HP4D]; Shawn Regan, A
Monumental Mistake, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 14, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.nationalre
view.com/2017/02/antiquities-act-outdated-progressive-law-bears-ears-national-monu
ment [https://perma.cc/5XUT-VFBR].
32. See generally, e.g., Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities
Act of 1906, 37 GA. L. REV. 473 (2003) [hereinafter Squillace, Monumental Legacy];
see generally Mark Squillace, et. al., Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Di-
minish National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2017) [hereinafter Squillace
et al., Abolish or Diminish]; John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, Presidential Authority to
Revoke or Reduce National Monument Designations, 35 YALE J. REG. 617, 618–19
(2018).
33. Steve Sherman, Scale Back President’s Power to Create National Monuments,
WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 12, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
scale-back-presidents-power-to-create-national-monuments [https://perma.cc/Y6EM-
2SP8].
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the Trump Administration for its willingness to consider altering
them34—yet very few have looked in the mirror and done anything to
draft a new statute that would complete the work necessary to facili-
tate their preferred policy outcome that would constrain either cate-
gory of presidential inclination. There have been momentary
exceptions with some bills introduced in Congress, although one must
question whether these have ever been considered serious efforts. For
example, H.R. 3990, the “National Monument Creation and Protec-
tion Act,” passed out of the Natural Resources Committee on Octo-
ber 11, 2017 by a twenty-three to seventeen vote.35 Beyond promising
a report to the full chamber recommending it for further considera-
tion, not much further progress has been made.36 Among its most sig-
nificant changes to the Antiquities Act, it specifically would have
excluded “natural geographic features” from the definition of objects
of antiquity capable of justifying a designation and identifies (and I
would say limits over the status quo) when a President may reduce the
size of a monument (in a likely unconstitutional manner). I am skepti-
cal that this bill would solve all of the monument problems even if it,
or something like it, passed into law. More fundamentally, I am skep-
tical it could ever pass. There are traditionally high hurdles posed for
high visibility moves that could be labelled anti-environmental—these
provide opponents with good, effective soundbites while separation of
powers principles are not well-suited to sound bite politics.
Perhaps H.R. 3990 was a recognition of congressional responsibility,
at least among the twenty-three that voted for it. Nonetheless, the fo-
cal point for debate remains largely on administrative authority or
abuse, despite the fact that the fault for this fiasco lies mostly with the
U.S. Congress (of 1906) for delegating near plenary authority to a
President to unilaterally convert normal public lands into high-level
protected zones.
The problems with the initial enabling legislation begin with its text.
The Antiquities Act of 1906 provides, in part, that “The President
may, in the President’s discretion, declare by public proclamation his-
toric landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects
of historic or scientific interest that are situated on land owned or con-
trolled by the Federal Government to be national monuments.”37
Presidents have interpreted this language as permitting proclamations
34. Julie Turkewitz & Lisa Friedman, Interior Secretary Proposes Shrinking Four
National Monuments, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/
24/us/bears-ears-utah-monument.html?login=email&auth=login-email [https://perma
.cc/HA8Y-H36D].
35. National Monument Creation and Protection Act, H.R. 3990, 115th Cong.
(2017).
36. H.R. 3990: National Monument Creation and Protection Act, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr3990 (last updated Oct. 6, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/NUR6-7QMK].
37. 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2014).
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of monuments for the preservation of places of natural significance,
often the most controversial ways the Act is used.38
Congress primarily intended the Antiquities Act to be an anti-loot-
ing statute that would allow the President to prevent the plunder and
irreparable loss of artifacts and other national treasures. But the loose
and poorly drafted language of the Antiquities Act does not compel
such a limited mandate.39
We should not be surprised that presidents interpret the authority
broadly and that President Obama used it to designate as much as he
did. Most presidents have similarly felt unconstrained by the Act’s
original purposes, instead accepting the invitation to preservationist
power afforded by the ill-drafted text.40
With the massive Obama-era monuments, popular outcry did not
blame Congress for creating the Antiquities Act, and few blamed
Congress for not passing laws to limit the Antiquities Act. Instead, the
blame went to President Obama for his interpretation of Congress’s
poorly drafted words.41
Some have refrained from the temptation of the national monu-
ment grant, such as Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W.
Bush.42 It is likely that these Presidents saw more benefit and expan-
sion of their influence from receiving support from their base voters
by not using their power. But Teddy Roosevelt set the practical prece-
dent by robustly invoking his newfound power as soon as it passed
Congress.43
There is a strong argument that Congress lacks the authority to
delegate its power as broadly as some have construed the Antiquities
Act.44 The U.S. Constitution’s Property Clause commits to Congress
38. Squillace, Monumental Legacy, supra note 32, at 485–99.
39. See id. at 482.
40. See id. at 490–514.
41. Andrew O’Reilly, Ranchers Spar with Obama Over National Monuments in
Utah and Nevada, FOX NEWS (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/
05/ranchers-spar-with-obama-over-new-national-monuments-in-utah-and-nevada
.html [https://perma.cc/F7MH-NLUP] (“Obama’s Monument proclamations . . . do
not represent the interests of the people.”); H. Sterling Burnett, Obama’s Dangerous
Use of the National Monument Law, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/10/12/obamas-dangerous-use-of-the-national-monu
ment-law/#39fff5274122 [https://perma.cc/PTC2-L2XN] (“The Antiquities Act is one
of the most ill-considered laws ever written . . . . Many presidents have used [the Act],
but none have done so more often or with such recklessness as Obama has.”); Greg-
ory Korte, Obama’s National Monuments Are About More Than Conservation, USA
TODAY (June 26, 2016, 4:19 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/
06/26/obamas-national-monuments-more-than-conservation/82931356 [https://perma
.cc/W8WC-GHR6] (claiming an Obama designation “exemplifies the president’s com-
plete disregard for the legislative process”).
42. Korte, supra note 41.
43. Squillace, Monumental Legacy, supra note 32, at 490.
44. See Squillace et al., Abolish or Diminish, supra note 32, at 56; Robert T. An-
derson, Protecting Offshore Areas from Oil and Gas Leasing: Presidential Authority
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the “power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.”45 When the Antiquities Act is broadly construed, it lacks any
discernible, intelligible principle that would constrain the executive
branch’s exercise of monument designation power.46 Congress thus
abdicates its responsibility to manage federal lands. That should make
the broad interpretation unconstitutional, but courts to date have not
taken such a stance in the few cases that have challenged monument
designations. Furthermore, each new Congress has largely acquiesced
in the generous interpretation. If the power of the President were con-
strained by the motivating purpose rather than the text of the Antiqui-
ties Act, we might see fewer, more thoughtful designations.
The lack of congressional or even normal agency involvement in
monument designations sacrifices beneficial deliberation and makes
them a less transparent means of preserving natural resources. Nota-
ble examples where this charge has been levied include the controver-
sial 1.9 million-acre Grand Staircase-Escalante monument designated
by President Clinton and the Bears Ears Monument designated by
President Obama.
Deliberative processes are designed to better appreciate the com-
plexities involved in federal land management. Blanket, broad-based
protective status for large, uninterrupted chunks of property is not al-
ways the wisest way to balance competing policy objectives.
Saying no to a broad presidential authority to proclaim national
monuments does not mean saying no to conservation. Public lands
statutes already authorize executive agencies to manage lands accord-
ing to democratically-established standards.47 These include the ability
to install limits on certain uses of the federal lands portfolio to accom-
plish preservation and conservation goals, subject to public participa-
tion requirements and judicial review. Moreover, when areas truly
need high-level protective status, Congress may (and has) exercised its
Property Clause power and shown the competency to confer special
protective status when prudent, such as through the creation of na-
tional parks and wilderness areas.48
But Congress has not shown a propensity to exercise this highly-
specific constitutional responsibility and has not guarded against the
creation of de facto national parks by near executive fiat under cover
Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the Antiquities Act, 44 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 727, 746 (2018).
45. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
46. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (articulating the
“intelligible principle” standard for nondelegation doctrine regarding the requirement
that congressional delegations of authority need to include such guidance).
47. See, e.g., Federal Land Management Policy Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1701
(2012).
48. National Park System, 54 U.S.C. §§ 100101–104907 (2012); National Wilder-
ness Preservation System, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–36 (1964).
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of the Antiquities Act. A substantial number of parks have been cre-
ated by “upgrading” designated national monuments. This is arguably
because the marginal change in status comes with less disruption to
other productive users of land who have already seen their uses cur-
tailed by the executive action. The protection/development or use
equilibrium has already shifted, such that the notch up to National
Park status has only marginal impact over the new monument-based
status quo.49 This is unlike an immediate change to a National Park
from general public or private lands by Congress—something which
would involve much larger pools of political capital because it would
be a far greater change away from the status quo and bring with it the
costs generally suffered when Congress must make and defend a
choice.
Until the Antiquities Act is repealed or amended, we must rely on
Presidents to exercise self-restraint and see the wisdom of more par-
ticipatory mechanisms to achieve conservation aims. But given our
human nature to exercise whatever authority we are given or can get
away with,50 those worried about the excess of presidential power to
proclaim national monuments should direct less attention at changing
the decisions of the individual, and more at Congress to change the
law that permits—indeed invites—those proclamations.
***
From the strategic institutional positioning perspective, the Na-
tional Monuments story is predictable. For those in Congress whose
preferences are aligned with broad National Monument designations,
they can claim that they gave the Executive authority to so designate
and share in the political advantages of a designation should they wish
to do so. Or, those whose constituents oppose national monuments
can claim that the administrative action has failed to honestly adhere
to the limits of the congressional legislation and tell their constituents
that the President is to blame. The less-immediately-accessible reasons
to blame Congress for creating the opening for the President, and the
behind-the-clouds fact that Congress could close the door on the pres-
idential authority if it really wished to fix the problem, stay obscured.
49. Robert W. Righter, National Monuments to National Parks: The Use of the
Antiquities Act of 1906, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Aug. 1989), https://www.nps.gov/parkhis-
tory/hisnps/npshistory/righter.htm#2 [https://perma.cc/PZC5-AWRQ].
50. See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, A Time for Choosing, Address on Behalf of Senator
Barry Goldwater (Oct. 27, 1964) (transcript available at Ronald Reagan, A Time for
Choosing, AM. RHETORIC, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagan
atimeforchoosing.htm [https://perma.cc/U9XF-N4G3]) (“No government ever volun-
tarily reduces itself in size. Governments’ programs, once launched, never disappear.
Actually, a government bureau is the nearest thing to eternal life we’ll ever see on this
earth.”).
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B. Example 2: Waters of the United States
Although this Essay could catalog many examples that fit into the
strategic abdication frame, it will limit its analysis to just one other
example—the CWA51 and the meaning of the phrase “Waters of the
United States,”52 or WOTUS as it has become its popularly used
acronym.
The CWA gives the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) jurisdiction to regu-
late discharges and other activities related to “navigable waters,” a
phrase which the CWA—in a manner far from a fount of clarity—
defines as “waters of the United States.”53 “Waters of the United
States” is thereafter not defined in the CWA. Hence, courts and the
relevant agencies have struggled to define its meaning, and its mallea-
bility has allowed for agencies to inject substantial policy preferences.
Across the past forty-plus years, the U.S. Supreme Court has gener-
ated a convoluted ping pong match of opinions, volleying between
wide and narrow interpretations of “waters of the United States” but
ultimately driven by the agencies themselves politicizing the term.54
Yet Congress has not intervened with corrective amendments that as-
sert its authority to define such a critical term. Rather than retake its
authority, most members of Congress critique the agency decisions as
deviant or consistent, depending on the baggage they want the term to
carry.
In a 2015 rulemaking, the EPA and Corps happily exploited the ju-
dicial uncertainty of meaning by adopting a dramatically broad, new
administrative definition of WOTUS.55 Amongst numerous challenges
in different courts,56 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
stayed the 2015 Rule.57 But in January 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court
51. Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012).
52. Id. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), (d), 1362(7).
53. Id.
54. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722–24 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of
N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162–64 (2001); United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123–24 (1985); see also
Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony
of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299,
314–15 (2008).
55. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 80 Fed. Reg.
37054, 37054-101 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts.
110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, and 401).
56. See, e.g., North Dakota v. U.S. E.P.A., 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1047 (D.N.D.
2015) (enjoining applicability of the 2015 WOTUS Rule in 13 States).
57. In re E.P.A., 803 F.3d 804, 805, 809 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom., In re
United States Dep’t of Def., 713 F. App’x. 489 (6th Cir. 2018).
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ruled that the Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction,58 and the Sixth Circuit
vacated its stay.59
Whatever “waters of the United States” means under the CWA, it
cannot possibly mean what the Obama Administration defined it to
mean in its 2015 WOTUS Rule. The Trump Administration EPA and
Corps are now undergoing rulemaking to rescind the 2015 rule and
conducting “a substantive re-evaluation of the definition of ‘waters of
the United States.’”60
Although the Trump Administration is engaged in rulemaking to
volley with a new administrative interpretation once again, the prob-
lem cries out for legislative clarification.61 Even a brief glimpse at the
regulatory and judicial dockets reveals why. Indeed, the regulatory
waves in the years since the onset of the Trump Administration are
dizzying. The comment period on the Trump Administration’s pro-
posed Step One Rule—the repeal rule with recodification of the pre-
existing rules, themselves problematic—closed on September 27,
2017;62 but the EPA and Corps issued a supplemental notice seeking
additional comments on the repeal rule in July 2018, with the com-
ment period closing in August 2018.63 Step Two—a new definition of
“waters of the United States”—is still to come. In November 2017, the
EPA and Corps also issued a press release announcing that they would
publish a new, separate proposal to amend the effective date of the
2015 rule, separate and apart from the rulemaking process to formally
repeal the 2015 rule—with a very short twenty-one-day comment pe-
riod.64 That “suspension rule” was finalized and published in the Fed-
58. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 634 (2018) (“Ultimately,
the Government’s policy arguments do not obscure what the statutory language
makes clear: Subparagraphs (E) and (F) do not grant courts of appeals exclusive juris-
diction to review the WOTUS Rule.”).
59. In re U.S. Dep’t of Def., 713 F. App’x. 489, 490 (6th Cir. 2018).
60. Dep’t of Def., Dep’t of the Army Corps of Eng’rs, Definition of “Waters of the






61. For more details on the 2015 WOTUS Rule, see Daren Bakst, et al., Restoring
Meaningful Limits to “Waters of the United States”, REG. TRANSPARENCY PROJECT
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-Energy-Environ
ment-Working-Group-Paper-WOTUS.pdf [https://perma.cc/AK87-CTDL].
62. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Supplemental Notice: Definition of “Waters of the
United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule/
supplemental-notice-definition-waters-united-states-recodification-preexisting-rule
(last updated July 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/E3FF-5BVQ].
63. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting
Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 32227, 32227 (proposed July 12, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R.
pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, and 401).
64. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA and the Army Propose to Amend the Effective
Date of the 2015 Rule Defining “Waters of the United States” (Nov. 16, 2017), https://
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eral Register in February 2018.65 But the rule was challenged in court
and the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina invali-
dated the suspension rule in August 2018.66 As of this writing, that
case is on appeal. Suffice it to say, it will be a long time before the
waves calm enough to see where the WOTUS Rule settles and what
the current definition of “waters of the United States” will be. Yet the
very occurrence of so much litigation and attempted administrative
solutions is clear proof that this is congressionally-created chaos inten-
sified by Congress abstaining from passing clarifying intervening
legislation.
For decades now, the phrase “waters of the United States” in the
CWA has been a catalyst for debates that implicate countless pressure
points in our system of law and policy. Most directly, the debate is
about the meaning of WOTUS. Related is whether a definite meaning
for those words can be found at all in the CWA using ordinary meth-
ods of statutory interpretation.67 This leads to questions about the ap-
propriate methodology courts should employ for interpreting
statutory text, an exercise which necessarily entails broad administra-
tive and constitutional law questions of what to do in the face of ambi-
guity, including how much deference to afford administrative
agencies. The resulting confusion surrounding statutory interpretation
also invites the question—where is Congress? Why is it forcing the
courts to struggle through all those steps? Why has it hardly passed
any serious environmental legislation since the 1970s? And why has it
not updated and clarified statutes that are filled with unclear man-
dates susceptible to abusive administrative interpretations that gener-
ate substantial uncertainty? Should Congress be able to pass the buck
by legislating in such vague terms so that agencies have almost unlim-
www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-and-army-propose-amend-effective-date-2015-rule-
defining-waters-united-states [https://perma.cc/B243-QDN7].
65. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability
Date to 2017 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33
C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, and 401).
66. S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Wheeler, No. 2:18-cv-00330-DCN, slip
op. at 2, 18 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2018).
67. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 734 (2006) (“In applying the
definition to ‘ephemeral streams,’ ‘wet meadows,’ storm sewers and culverts, ‘direc-
tional sheet flow during storm events,’ drain tiles, man-made drainage ditches, and
dry arroyos in the middle of the desert, the Corps has stretched the term ‘waters of
the United States’ beyond parody. The plain language of the statute simply does not
authorize the ‘Land of Waters’ approach to federal jurisdiction.”); Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170–71 (2001)
(“Beyond Congress’ desire to regulate wetlands adjacent to ‘navigable waters,’ re-
spondents point us to no persuasive evidence that the House bill was proposed in
response to the Corps’ claim of jurisdiction over nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate
waters or that its failure indicated congressional acquiescence to such jurisdiction.”);
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985) (“We can-
not say that the Corps’ conclusion that adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound up
with the ‘waters’ of the United States . . . is unreasonable.”).
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ited power to fill the gaps? Again, this is a convenient and strategic
position for Congress. And despite the Framers’ belief that Congress
would want to preserve its final decision-making authority on issues
near to its institutional purpose,68 human nature has taken us along a
different path.
VI. WHY THESE PROBLEMS ARE ACUTE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
This final Part offers a few additional thoughts on what makes envi-
ronmental policies prone to these perversions in constitutional power
dynamics. Quite simply, these problems are acute in the environmen-
tal realm because environmental policy involves highly transparent,
hot-button issues, generating unique optics through narratives that are
accessible to almost anyone, not just experts.69
Environmental issues are presented in a particularly potent frame—
and one that individuals regularly view as a binary choice between
environmental protection and not environmental protection. In fact,
the EPA’s name is one example where the agency seems to be boxed
into a uni-directional imperative that constrains the universe of ac-
ceptable initial policy positions. For example, once the EPA has set a
course definitionally in the direction of environmental protection
through regulatory intervention, any move by that same agency or
Congress that reverses direction becomes optically challenged as
against the direction of protection. Congress is very sensitive to this
delicate dance and exploits it through engaging in the strategic abdica-
tion discussed at the outset of this Essay.
There is one other issue worth mentioning regarding why Congress
is particularly willing to allow environmental agencies to aggrandize.
As the federal administrative state promulgates more environmental
regulations, it further legitimizes a larger federal role generally. Thus,
68. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 333; see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 483.
69. Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 433, 440 (2008) (“While environmental debate is hardly alone among hot-button
topics in eliciting emotionally charged public debate, environmental law is particularly
vulnerable to behavioral anomalies . . . .”); Charles Gottlieb, Regional Land Use Plan-
ning: A Collaborative Solution for the Conservation of Natural Resources, 29 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 35, 38 (2014) (“Environmental policy is often controversial because envi-
ronmental impacts transcend governmental boundaries.”); A. Dan Tarlock, Who
Owns Science?, 10 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 136 n.3 (2002) (“The tension between
expertise and democratic control traces back to Plato and Aristotle, but it is a particu-
larly troublesome problem for environmental law, which is an unstable mix of the
rational and emotional.”); Robert F. Blomquist, The Beauty of Complexity, 39 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 555, 566 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: AIR AND WATER) (“Such is the lot of environmental law: As it has grown older,
it has become stranger, its pattern more complicated. Indeed, the idea of complexity
is essential to understanding the meaning and operation of environmental law and
policy.”).
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Congress’s institutional interest in a larger scope of legislative author-
ity is served by the validation of federal administrative authority be-
cause such validation tends to erode limits on federal authority
generally. This enlargement of federal jurisdiction results because en-
vironmental harms present powerful narratives for justifying federal
reach. Those favoring environmental regulation can easily offer claims
that the problems they seek to address implicate transboundary issues
and generate ecosystem effects necessitating nationwide policies and
uniform federal control. As a result, environmental cases pave the
path to precedents that interpret general federal regulatory authority
broadly. A disproportionate number of cases in administrative law
textbooks and in the commerce clause section of constitutional law
textbooks, for example, are environmental regulation cases.
Congress gets to piggyback on broad administrative reach to set
precedent for broader federal legislative reach. Therefore, from a stra-
tegic institutional perspective, an enlarged administrative state be-
comes a gateway that helps justify a broader reach of federal
legislative authority too. As this process plays out, Congress is able to
gradually and incrementally benefit with each new expansion of fed-
eral authority effected by the aggregation of validated administrative
actions, while simultaneously evade the blame for what by direct legis-
lative means would appear as highly visible, transparent power grabs
away from the states.
VII. CONCLUSION
Revealing how and why strategic positioning by both Congress and
the Executive have aligned to facilitate and encourage lawmaking
without Congress is an important step toward change. By understand-
ing these institutional incentives and the inter-branch interplay they
support, we can better appreciate just how difficult it can be to re-
channel primary responsibility for developing and overseeing the ad-
aptation of environmental law back to Congress.
The acceptability of agency gap-filling in environmental and other
regulatory statutes has perhaps made Congress less important as a de-
tailed-legislative institution (although one with wider federal jurisdic-
tion, as noted in Part VI). In addition, agency gap-filling allows
Congress to shift the political costs of many decisions onto the agen-
cies as Congress tries to distance itself from the detailed decisions that
most directly affect individuals. The complementary forces discussed
here ensure the enlargement of the administrative state far beyond
what the Framers could have imagined. Congress is self-interested, as
the Framers expected. But it turns out its self-interest, or the self-in-
terest of its individual members, do not always coincide with retention
of legislative power and jealous guardianship of their own
prerogatives.
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These conditions have real consequences for the separation of pow-
ers but also for effective environmental policy. The dynamic nature of
the ecosystem makes regular policy changes necessary in the environ-
mental law field,70 but the legislature is not one to pursue an aggres-
sively adaptive theory of legislative responsibility. The optical
entrenchment of existing laws makes environmental laws some of the
most difficult to change, despite being an area most in need of—and
most deserving of, from a good governance standpoint—regular legis-
lative adjustment as ambiguities are discovered, as new facts are
learned, as new scientific knowledge is gained, as ecosystems them-
selves change, and as technological understanding and the capacity to
address problems of all types emerges.
70. See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, Economics-Based Environmentalism in the Fourth
Generation of Environmental Law, 21 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 47, 51 (2015)
(discussing, inter alia, the polycentric nature of environmental law and the need for
regular updating).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL202.txt unknown Seq: 22  8-FEB-19 11:58
